The end of hegemony and the return to a multipolar order
Having analyzed the history of American foreign policy and global power balances in my previous article (recommended but not necessary reading), in this we are going to carefully observe the latest dynamics in global power structures, through the latest changes in American foreign policy as well as the influence of other decisive events on the world scene.
Global changes
The American potential as hegemon has been and is being diminished by the changes of an increasingly complex international governance: the democratization of States has promoted procedures of conflict resolution that favor the path of cooperation-collaboration in political matters and not that of violence. The existence of a greater number of state and non-state actors has generated new dynamics and processes, incorporating new issues on the agenda and demanding a more participatory governance. This plurality poses the possibility of an international system as a collective construction.
Gradually, we notice a change of axis from geopolitics to geoeconomics, which results in a greater interdependence. Therefore, Globalization demands more effective and efficient responses to systemic problems, only available to transnational and non-governmental actors. He nation-state It continues to be the most important actor, but its role in the system has decreased in favor of international organizations and transnational companies. The change in values experienced (global nature of the problems, cooperation, community of interests, etc.) has allowed the formation of a development-based agenda.
In short, The world of the 21st century represents a change with respect to the previous century, not only in terms of dynamics and issues, but also in the behavior of these. The US Army War College coined the acronym “VUCA” to describe the post-Cold War world, characterized by its Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity. In a world with these characteristics, hegemony and unipolarity seem very unlikely, especially when this new behavior of the post-Cold War world has not caused a corresponding change in the global governance effort (key to achieving hegemony) exercised by the United States. . This realization is complemented, or rather responded to, with the birth of populist political currents (derived precisely from the changes already mentioned, particularly globalization) in the United States that would lead to the election of Donald J. Trump as President.
A contradictory global vision
La foreign policy of the presidents, especially Republicans, after the Cold War, was characterized by his neoconservatism. That is, They claimed American supremacy and leadership in the international system. For public opinion, the US was the “police of the world.” This conception has its roots in the Cold War, at the end of it and takes all its meaning in the unipolar moment. It seems increasingly clear that unipolarity in the international system has been and can be questioned; In fact, it has been this way since 11/XNUMX, so that rather than a period of unipolarity, the international system has only experienced a moment of true unipolarity, between the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 11, 2001.
During the Cold War the self-imposed American mission is defeat of the Soviet Union, the spread of capitalism and democracy, and the maintenance of a strong system of alliances that guarantee collective security, all ultimately motivated by the defense of national interests. This “mission” is what justifies, on the American side, the creation of a bipolar international system, in which the United States (inspired by Wilson's 14 points) promotes a world order in which Public International Law is developed and create governance and cooperation institutions, ranging from the UN to the system of Bretton Woods (the US dollar as a reference currency and the defense of free trade) and its institutions (the IMF and the World Bank).
Your creation may look like a commitment to multilateralism on the part of the United States (although the initiative was American, many States participated), but without going any further from reality, this world order (especially in the Bretton Woods aspect) is fundamentally a American effort to exercise leadership of all these States at the global level, especially in the face of the Cold War (The US ensures the superiority of its currency and helps rebuild a ruined Europe so that its economic dominance is assured.). Regarding this, it is a mistake to criticize the United States for pursuing an imperialist policy in the creation of these institutions; the rest of the “like-minded” states participated in their creation and found benefits in the United States exercising leadership.
The global primacy of the US in monetary and financial terms as consequence of Bretton Woods, was not seen so much as a “realistic” movement, in defense of American economic interests, but rather as a movement to a certain extent idealistic, in the mentality of the American exceptionalism so common at the time (and so in decline today). According to this perspective, which defends the US not subjecting itself to the same rules as the rest of the powers, the unfair thing would be for the US to be at the same level as the rest of the nations, only leadership is fair.
However, the world has changed since the beginning of the Cold War, these institutions and systems have followed a process in which they have remained guided by the multilateralism they represent even when this has not been in the best interest of the United States. Specifically, the Bretton Woods system was dissolved between 1968 and 1973, when the dollar was no longer backed by gold, leaving the door open for other currencies to eventually replace it as the reference currency (something that has not yet happened despite that the dollar finds increasingly strong rivals in the Euro and the Yuan).
In the same way, the United States, which has remained largely faithful to UN multilateralism as it is in its interests, has also ended up facing it, especially in the context of the Iraq war, which was not legitimate at all. the eyes of International Law, since at no time was a UN mandate obtained to proceed with the invasion. Specifically, the Iraq War not only shook the regulatory order that International Organizations such as the UN had tried to build, but it also shook the system of alliances that the United States maintains around the world, especially with regard to its European partners.
Despite the support of a few Atlanticist European leaders in the Azores Trio (specifically Tony Blair and Jose María Aznar) the world's popular public opinion, and in particular the European one (and within this, the opposition of Spanish citizens was even more remarkable, with 90% of Spaniards opposing the War) was strongly against the Iraq War. This not only affected the legitimacy of the American intervention in this conflict, but also strongly damaged the European vision of the United States. In a devastating way, 80% of Europeans perceived the United States as the greatest threat to world peace. , even above Saddam Hussein's Iraq (Chomsky, 2016).
American foreign policy defends international cooperation, international law, multilateral institutions and human rights inspired by the Wilsonian principles that have guided this nation, but these values have never been an obstacle to the achievement of its interests, whether compatible or not. with the previous ones. The abuse of pseudo-imperialist policies by the US may have found justification during the Cold War in the defense of the West and democracy against Soviet totalitarianism, but it has had a hard time finding it after it.
However, finally, something similar has been repeated in the global war against terrorism (War on Terror) that began on 11/XNUMX, which has served as justification for actions questionable from the point of view of human rights. But while it is very easy to antagonize the US and especially its policies, it is also pertinent to try to see the situation through its eyes or, more specifically, through the eyes of the American people, who have supported (more or less) their governments. . It is morally complicated to supervise the action of a State threatened by international terrorism like the United States, Is there a nobler objective than the security of its citizens to justify foreign action? Perhaps, as the doctor in International Relations Rubén Herrero de Castro stated, “perhaps Guantánamo exists because it is necessary for Guantánamo to exist.”
It is true that guaranteeing the security of its citizens is essential for every country, but it is also true that sometimes this noble goal can be abused as a scapegoat to endanger global peace in the pursuit of other interests. When a State takes “justice into its own hands” with the excuse of guaranteeing collective security, it can have disastrous results. Returning to the same example, the invasion of Iraq was carried out without conclusive evidence that weapons of mass destruction existed and this was followed by a period of instability that has been one of the conditions that has facilitated the emergence and proliferation of the Islamic State.
Although it does not always have to be this way, for example, the United States also violated international law when it sent an elite team to end the life of Osama Bin Laden, but it is difficult to morally argue that the murder of an enemy of peace like this terrorist is not justified, no matter how much the sovereignty of Pakistan (where he was hiding) and the International Treaties that prohibit this type of actions were violated. How then can we guarantee collective security without falling into these violations of law that some public opinion considers illegitimate and others as unpleasant, but necessary?
Perhaps the United States would not have had to resort to violating the sovereignty of other States, Human Rights or International Law if there were institutions of international cooperation with sufficient integration to be able to guarantee collective security from a multilateral level and with greater legitimacy. But, for these to exist, it is necessary a prior commitment to current institutions and their normative order, which has been diminished since the US has resorted to the opposite route. This greater integration for security is a double-edged sword, it not only legitimizes the defense of collective security on a greater scale, but it delegitimizes in an even more forceful way those actors who decide not to comply with it, and in a world with so much information and where (at least still) parliamentary democracy is the most popular political system, this can lead to greater polarization, which is also undesirable.
This contradiction in foreign action has cost the United States dearly, particularly in the field of world public opinion, fundamental for US hegemony, which has been established thanks to its alliances that, in the long term, depend on the public perception of the US abroad. Meanwhile, other emerging powers that aspire to compete with the United States understand the importance of public opinion; there are “soft power” tools, such as television channels, such as the Russian RT, that systematically criticize the West and defend the Russian vision. of the world.
For instance, the success of Russian troops in defeating the Islamic State is used as propaganda, which generates a very good image abroad. Or there is also Chinese CCTV, which does something very similar or the old one “panda diplomacy”. China goes one step further and through the initiative of the New Silk Road (which is essentially “hard power”), in addition to ensuring its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, tries to gain a more favorable public opinion through massive economic investments abroad. Meanwhile, the US (especially since Donald Trump's presidency) He seems to have greatly neglected his image abroad..
Leadership in the Trump era
For the United States to be a superpower and a political reference on a global level, it is not only necessary to be one, but also to want it and look like it. As much as one wants to criticize the American leadership of the West since the Second World War, it is more than clear that there has been a political will to do so within the United States, since we talk about the “New World Order” post-Cold War by George HW Bush in his speech after the 1st Gulf War, which consists of the establishment of a world order led by the US, based on norms and multilateral institutions. In fact, when George W. Bush (Jr.) goes to war again with Iraq, this time contrary to International Law and American public opinion, he continues to project an image of leaders in the global effort in the fight against terrorism. Questioned or not, the United States has always been the leader of the West, the “police of the world,” according to public opinion.
With the arrival of Donald Trump to the Oval Office, this speech ended completely, there has been an important turn of events. Under the slogan of “America First”, Trump has withdrawn troops from Syria, is withdrawing from Afghanistan, questions the existence of NATO and has left the WHO. This does not mean a return to isolationismOn the contrary, the Trump administration has eliminated the leader of the armed wing of the Islamic revolution in Iran, has led the delegitimization campaign against Nicolás Maduro, has strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia and, practically from the beginning of its mandate, has established a trade war with the People's Republic of China.
The change in foreign policy has not been one of methodology or means, the objectives have changed. American leadership or remaining in international governance systems is not sought. The erroneous analysis would consist of saying that the US has stopped defending global interests and has started defending national interests, when in reality the US has always put its national interests first. The real change with the Trump administration's foreign policy is the abandonment of the “wilsonian idealism” about which we have spoken before and which has characterized the foreign action of the United States since the beginning of the last century. This is something fundamental that is often ignored in the study of American foreign policy, usually tacitly labeled as realistic, although in its complexity it combines both realism and idealism; the contradiction is repeated.
Even Kissinger, one of the most characteristic representatives of the realist school of thought, has a strong idealistic root. This makes Trump's US does not project the necessary image nor is it the true leader of the West. One could argue that this is something particular to the Trump administration, which If a defender of transatlantic relations like Joe Biden is elected in November, everything will return to normal, but this is not something so easy, the necessary trust is gained gradually, little by little, and lost in an instant.
The unipolar moment could not be extended for these two reasons that we have explained, one series of global changes that have not been treated in the appropriate manner by American foreign action and a contradictory methodology in foreign policy that has lost its reason for being after the Cold War and that despite managing to hide behind the fight against terrorism has undermined public opinion of the US in the world. But it is somewhat incorrect to blame the US's withdrawal from the position of sole superpower solely on the US itself. It is necessary to understand the role that powers such as China and Russia have played in establishing themselves as rival powers to the United States, but we will analyze that in another article.
Related Reading:
- Chomsky, N. (2016). Hegemony or survival (1st ed.). Editions B.
- Nye, Jr., J. (2020). After the Liberal International Order. Project Syndicate
- Alexander, C., & Daniel H., N. (2020). How Hegemony Ends. Foreign Affairs, 99(4), 143-156.
Hello! I am a jurist and internationalist, semi-finalist of the XIII San Francisco Javier Debate League, fond of debate, photography, Rubik's cubes, maps and history. From Marbella but living in Córdoba.
