China's public opinion about the West in the times of COVID-19

China seen from the West 

The influence of media in the formulation of public opinion, and hence on politics, has been widely recognized since the 19th century. However, the role of fourth power has taken on even greater weight since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, this is due to the situation of adversity and great uncertainty, in which the media have become a source of vital information. On the other hand, the impossibility of having in-person contact has increased the use of social networks, fertile ground for all kinds of propaganda and disinformation.  

China published the genome of the new coronavirus on January 9, but the outbreak was slow to receive media attention in the West, with several political leaders denying its existence or underestimating its severity. In the absence of an official name, Donald Trump took the opportunity to score political points in his offensive against China by coining the derogatory name “chinese virus”, which has come to stay, just like the “Spanish flu”. Seeking sensation, always from an ethnocentric perspective, the media opted to portray the Chinese as savages who eat bats, snakes, dogs... Thus, on the foundations of fear and pre-existing stereotypes, it was consolidated Sinophobia. 

And when the media did cover the virus, they either presented it as something distant or blamed China for secrecy. As it was only possible to compare COVID-19 with SARS-Cov-1, in just one month China had reached 10 times the total number of SARS cases between 2002 and 2004. But while some said that the Chinese were infecting the rest of the world, others (or even the same ones) reproached the harsh measures imposed by the Communist Party as an attack on individual freedoms. In the midst of these contradictions the only permanent thing was criticism. 

However, the tone of voice began to change as China flattened the contagion curve in mid-March and Western governments appeared incapable of managing the crisis. Little by little the media began to applaud efficiency of the centralized regime, the prevention of outbreaks and the economic recovery of China, which is the only great power to register growth this year. The comparison between different countries has allowed the United States to once again be crowned the world leader: with a quarter of China's population, The US has 100 times more confirmed cases. 

Therefore, public opinion in the West remains divided regarding China's performance during the pandemic, oscillating between blaming it and praising it. But little is known about the opinion of the Chinese: how do they rate the management of their government? And that of Western administrations?

China's response

The official speech 

The concept of save face, that is, protecting the honor or status of a person, is crucial in Chinese culture and is extrapolated to the level of the State in the constant attention to the opinion that other countries have of China. Therefore, in March and April, China focused on combating its negative image through the so-called “diplomacy of generosity” or “mask diplomacy”. Furthermore, the ambassadors reinforced their twiplomacy and they dedicated themselves to writing opinion articles for the Western press. As the strategy did not bring the expected results, in political circles the old debate: Should China wage a narrative war against critics or remain humble and peaceful?

Although China cannot afford to show any sign of weakness, diplomats are aware that Intensive outward projection can be counterproductive. Hence, they have chosen to abandon verbal attacks and reassure the world again, always highlighting their altruism. In accordance with the concern for non-interference in national sovereignty and doctrine of “peaceful rise” The official speech has reaffirmed the Chinese commitment to multilateralism, international cooperation and economic development for all countries. 

A clear example of this is the speech which Xi Jinping spoke at the General Assembly of the UN on September 23, structured entirely around COVID-19. The Chinese president once again recalled the need for collaboration in building a common future and explicitly denied the pursuit of hegemony or spheres of influence, but what surprised the public was the announcement of carbon neutrality planned for the year 2060. Although at no point did he mention the United States, the speech was clearly in opposition to Trump's position: to the "America first"and individual liberties opposed"people and life first”, and to protectionism and isolation, globalism. This preference for subtle hints can be explained by the fact that China is a high-context culture, that is, according to the model of anthropologist Edward Hall, communication is usually indirect, but it is also a tactic that further highlights the difference with Trump, who constantly uses attacks against China as part of his re-election campaign.  

On the other hand, the decrease in political statements about the West is due to the displacement of focus on internal affairs: the virus is practically eradicated and the Chinese economy has returned to normal, efforts have been resumed for the definitive elimination of the poverty whose deadline was 2020, and the Communist Party has just approved the new five-year plan. In this context, the priority of the political elite is not to hurt other countries but strengthen the national pride of the Chinese. On October 23, Xi Jinping delivered a speech on the 70th anniversary of the Korean war calling on the public (all in masks despite the absence of cases) to patriotism and the defense of Chinese territorial integrity and dignity. By exalting the Chinese spirit that had allowed the communist republic to defeat the greatest military power, the president sent a clear message that China was not afraid of the United States, while on the other side of the Pacific the last electoral debate between Trump and Biden was permeated with fear of the Asian giant. 

The media 

Unlike politicians, the Chinese press has taken a much more belligerent approach, whose main target is the United States. It is very common in Chinese newspapers to summarize news from external media, but the selection of materials, even when not accompanied by a commentary, is enough to express a contrary position. In other words, by choosing news that criticizes the management of the pandemic by Western governments or that is favorable towards China, the press fulfills its agenda-setting function (agenda setting) and framing (framing). Naturally, this trend has been accentuated with the arrival of the second wave of the virus.

A review of the editorial section of the media in the period between October 12 and 25 has identified Xinhua, the state news agency, as the main source of opinion pieces on the incompetence of the West (with a total of 7). On the other hand, the lower frequency in the pages of People's Daily (1), Reference News (1), Global Times (1) and the think tanks Zhiku (2) points out that they fulfill their duty to follow the Party line but after so many months their zeal has diminished.  

The predominant theme among the media is the failure of the US in the management of COVID-19, going so far as to represent it as a failed state that converted outbreaks en out-of-control. Chinese journalists point out that the current administration is making no effort to address the situation in its own country, but is instead using political manipulation to create tension on the international scene. They identify as the reason the human error committed by the political class as a whole: the refusal to prepare despite Chinese warnings, lies and prejudices, incompetence and evasion of responsibility. China condemns the politicization of human suffering: The economy has been put above public health, politics trumps science, and elections are more important than COVID. This causes the United States to lose its credibility as the global defender of human rights, especially in light of its withdrawal from the WHO, the imposition of restrictions on international trade and the attempt to monopolize vaccines. 

Although the term West is often used, China's attitude toward Europe is markedly better than toward the United States. The criticism of initial complacency, the perception of the economy and the pandemic as a zero-sum game, and short-termism coincide. But, unlike the US, The European Union raises empathy and solidarity since it is seen as a strategic ally in the fight for multilateralism and cooperation, forced by American abandonment and the second wave of the virus to get closer and closer to China. 

It is worth mentioning that most Chinese newspapers have a cartoon section, dominated in these months by the topic of COVID-19. The creativity of China Daily stands out, a media outlet published entirely in English, that is, oriented exclusively towards the external public, which makes use of hashtag #ChinaDailyCartoon to reach a large number of Facebook and Twitter users. 

The movies 

In stark contrast to the rest of the world, Chinese cinemas enjoy considerable success, despite the capacity limited to 75%. The strong season was inaugurated by The Eight Hundred which has grossed about 460 million dollars around the world and today occupies the first place of the highest-grossing films of 2020. The plot focuses on the defense of the city of Shanghai in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937. Later , on the occasion of the national holiday on October 1, another series of patriotic films was released: Leap, My People, My Homeland y Coffee or Tea?. The box office totaled 580 million dollars during the “golden week”, this being the second best result in the entire history of Chinese cinema. And to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Korean War, The Sacrifice, which raised 15 million on the first day alone. The resurgence of Chinese production goes hand in hand with the rejection of Western films, Mulan being the quintessential example. 

Hollywood in the conflict between the United States and China

The opinion of the Chinese public 

Social networks  

The official speech has declared the government's victory over the coronavirus, but do citizens agree? Despite the widespread idea in the West that there is no freedom of expression in China, there are evidence that the popularization of the Internet and social networks (QQ, WeChat, Weibo, and recently TikTok) It has freed public debate, empowering citizens and revolutionizing the relationship between them and the State. This is due, on the one hand, to the loss of control over information by the Communist Party, and on the other, to the ability of users to mobilize and avoid censorship (often using indirect language). 

Indeed, at the beginning of the pandemic, the Internet was flooded with criticism of the handling of the virus, causing a crisis of confidence. In fact, the Party recognized the initial slowness and even promotion the publication of complaints. However, the first signs of change were noticed in mid-February and by March the tone had changed to approval. When the focus shifted from the city of Wuhan to outbreaks in other countries, comments began urging them to imitate effective Chinese policies. This transformation validates previous observations that online public opinion responds quickly to real events both in China and around the world.

Un full test of more than 13.000 posts on Zhihu (a Q&A platform similar to Quora) concluded that the speech during the pandemic was confident and rational, that is, without emotional or unfounded statements, but also confrontational and xenophobic, in response to external provocations. 53% of the posts revealed a aspiration for world leadership, with a gap between China's current international role and its national strength. This ambition has nationalist roots: pride in recent achievements (32%), as well as history, whether glorious (16%) or humiliating (20%). The United States is seen as biased (10%), China-bashing (9%), arrogant (9%), ineffective (7%), hegemonic (6%), paper tiger (5%), and selfish. European Union member countries are also perceived as selfish, due to their inability to come up with a common response, lack of support for the most affected countries such as Italy, and taking health materials intended for others. 

Opinion polls  

Beyond the netizens, the positive attitude of the entire Chinese population is supported by various opinion polls. In one research carried out in May among almost 20.000 people in 31 provinces, 75% were satisfied with the dissemination of information and 67% with the provision of protective products and materials. A great difference is observed between the levels of government: the national level enjoys the support of 89% of the population, while the municipal level only reaches 67%. Additionally, almost half indicate that the pandemic has increased their trust in the national government, while only 3% have seen their trust decreased. 

Another poll allows us to examine the evolution of public opinion from June of last year to May 2020. Trust in the central government has increased from 8.23 ​​(an already high number) to 8.87, and at the same time the preference for the Chinese political system compared to others has risen from 7.78 to 8.56. On the contrary, sympathy towards the United States has dropped one point from 5.77 to 4.77. Additionally, the study indicates that groups that tend to be more critical of the government (especially the most educated) have experienced the steepest increases.

The engines of nationalism 

COVID-19 has provided an additional boost to Chinese nationalism that has been on the rise for two decades. Some of the labels used to describe Chinese nationalism are defensive, reactive, Confucian, pragmatic, competitive. Nationalist sentiment has always been strong in areas of security and sovereignty, such as Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands, but in the last ten years it has spread to issues of culture, technology and traditional medicine.  

One of its permanent characteristics is the greater trust towards the central government compared to the local level, as already mentioned above. A sondeo Opinion polls between 2003 and 2016 show an increase in satisfaction with Beijing from 86% to 93%, and with the municipal administration from 43% to 70%. For comparison, Gallup results from the United States in the same period show about 37% satisfaction with the federal government and 70% with local governments. A possible explanation lies in the fact that Chinese citizens interact more with the local administration and are therefore aware of widespread corruption, and at the same time they see that it does not implement the policies announced by the central government. 

The resilience of the Chinese regime is based on its high efficiency: on the one hand, the economic miracle since the Reform and Opening-up in 1979 has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty, on the other hand, the country has enjoyed unprecedented political stability. This legitimacy by results sustains the pact between citizens and the Communist Party, which has definitively replaced the ideological discourse with the nationalist one, in clear challenge to the original communist internationalism. As a result, there is a generational gap: Those born since 1980 have grown up in a prosperous and self-confident China, protected from false information and instability thanks to the Great Backfire (Great Firewall). Furthermore, the political scientist Zhao Suisheng affirms that young Chinese have a "liberal nationalism" which at first glance seems an oxymoron, but refers to the liberal attitude in domestic affairs and nationalist in external affairs. 

In this context, COVID-19 produced a rally 'round the flag effect not only in China, but in most countries, this is understood as a temporary increase in the popularity of political leaders in times of crisis or war. The time factor has also played an important role: in the last month the inefficiency of Western governments has coincided with the celebration of the national holiday and the anniversary of the Korean War. As a result, the impact on China has been prolonged due to the conviction that Western “Chinese virus” narratives, in conjunction with longstanding criticisms of Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, reveal malign intent and double standards. Therefore, When the West attacks the central government, the Chinese feel obliged to defend it, even if they disapprove of the local government, and thus avoid a second century of humiliation. 

Global implications 

The experience of the First World War revealed the dangers of widespread nationalism, and in this sense The rise of far-right parties is worrying in recent years. Although globalization has led to the redistribution of power from the sovereign State to various non-state actors, the declaration of the state of emergency due to COVID-19 has increased it. Although in times of crisis fear makes people expect the government to provide them with greater security, the lengthening of the pandemic transforms this feeling into anxiety, from which populist movements feed. 

In these times of tension it has become fashionable to talk about a second Cold War. But this is very different from the above, since China and the United States are intimately interconnected and the basis of the confrontation is not ideology, but efficiency. Unlike the Soviet Union, China surpasses the weakened United States in the ability to produce economic, technological, military results, etc., which is especially attractive for developing States. And the management of the health crisis has demonstrated Chinese efficiency in an undoubted way. Therefore, the mobilization of public opinion, with a clear nationalist overtone as proven above, is a natural response to the perceived gap between Chinese success and the constant unfounded criticism it faces. However, instead of giving in to the temptation of war of words against Trump, China has repeated time and time again that it only seeks to regain its rightful place in the world once and for all. peaceful way, in accordance with Confucian values ​​and its patent multilateralism. In his speech before the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping stressed that China does not intend to enter into either hot or cold wars with any state. 

China has openly declared its objective: to become a leader of the international system by the year 2049, when the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic will be celebrated. This goal is pursued with increasing assertiveness, which is nourished by the support of its own population: the public sphere shows a almost perfect alignment between the speech of politicians, the agenda promoted by the media, the opinion of citizens and even the production of the private sector, in clear contrast to the polarization and protests in the West. Understanding the internal dynamics between the State and Chinese citizens is an issue that is often ignored, but essential for anyone interested in international relations. 

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