Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense (CEP)

Introduction

Permanent Structured Cooperation, abbreviated CEP (PESCO), is a process and framework for defense cooperation in the European Union through investments and joint projects. The main objective is develop capabilities of defense and make them available for military operations, whether national or multinational (not only EU missions, but also NATO and UN missions). It is an instrument Voluntary, but legally binding, which is provided for in the EU Treaty.

The CEP is a fundamental component of the Common Security and Defense Policy (PCSD), which in turn forms part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and contributes to the EU Global Strategy. Public opinion is especially positive towards CSDP: the results of the Eurobarometer They consistently show an approval rating of between 71% and 78%. Besides, The EU as a whole has the second largest military spending in the world. However, duplications and lack of interoperability make it urgent to address efficiency, and what better way than by boosting cooperation and coordination through the EPC.

More than three years after their creation, CEP projects suffer from poor performance. Now the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the leadership of High Representative Josep Borrell has the potential to exploit its position as ECL Secretariat to improve the global role of the Union, as promised in 2019 by the self-proclaimed “Geopolitical Commission” by Von Der Leyen. Recent developments, such as the approval of third country conditions and the election of Joe Biden as the new US president, provide an additional incentive to strengthen cooperation with NATO rather than halting EU integration.

Legal basis and nature

The CEP was first introduced in the 2003 Constitution (Article III-312) and its failure was responsible for subsequent difficulties. Although the same provision was incorporated into the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (mentioned in article 42 paragraph 6, and detailed in article 46, as well as in Protocol 10), this was never activated, which further increased skepticism towards defense cooperation. Therefore, former Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker called it the “sleeping Beauty” of Lisbon and continually advocated for her. 

After long preparations, The year 2016 saw an unexpected strong boost for security and defense cooperation: la Global Strategy was adopted in June and followed in November Implementation Plan for Security and Defense and European Defense Action Plan. In 2017 it was agreed coordinated annual defense review (CARD) and proposed the European Defense Fund (FED) and the European Defense Industrial Investment Plan (EDIDP). This unprecedented level of outward attention cannot be understood without taking into account the geostrategic situation at the time, namely the election of Trump and the Brexit referendum. 

In June 2017, the European Council tasked the High Representative with launching the EPC. Nevertheless, The initiative came from the Member States, led by France, Germany, Spain and Italy. During an informal meeting in Tallinn in September the Defense Ministers reached an agreement on binding commitments. A middle ground was reached between France's idea of ​​a small ambitious group with considerable capabilities ready to deploy in Africa, and Germany's inclusive approach that envisioned creating common resources and projecting an image of unity after Brexit. As a result, the CEP is ambitious and inclusive: Any State that wishes can join simply by committing to improve its capabilities and participate in at least one common project.

On November 13, 2017, 23 States signed the notification from CEP to the Council and the VP/HR. They specified 10 principles of cooperation (among which are the legal and political framework, the long-term vision of collective defense, the annual evaluation, sovereignty, production orientation, modular nature); and 20 binding commitments grouped into five themes: defense investment, harmonization, availability and interoperability, correction of deficiencies and equipment programs.

Subsequently, Portugal and Ireland expressed their intention to join the initiative. Following receipt of the national implementation plans, on December 11 the Council activated the CEP through its Decision 2017/2315. Only Denmark and Malta have chosen not to take part in the cooperation process, and the United Kingdom had already scheduled its departure. In March 2018 the Council established the Roadmap implementation of the CEP and three months later the governance rules.

Since it does not require the participation of all States, the CEP is similar to enhanced cooperation in other areas. What distinguishes CEP from other processes is its binding nature (there is a “nuclear” provision to suspend a State if it does not comply with its obligations), along with the incentives in the form of the European Defense Fund (which in the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 amounts to 8.000 million euros) and the greater role of the Commission (traditionally far from security issues but known for providing the necessary boost to the projects in which it participates). 

Implementation and evaluation

There are two levels of governance within the EPC: a general level (the EU Council in its Foreign Affairs formation, which takes decisions unanimously) and a project level (the EEAS and the European Defense Agency (EDA) serve as PESCO Secretariat). Therefore, The defense cooperation framework is centered on the sovereign State, since from the beginning it was initiated by the Member States themselves rather than the Commission. However, the CEP still it's perceived as a “top-down machination directed by Brussels”, although state sovereignty is reaffirmed in all documents. This explains the fact that Most pre-existing or new bilateral and multilateral programs will not be launched under the CEP. This amounts to a missed opportunity and highlights the need for stronger leadership, preferably from the EEAS as some states have already shown themselves in favor of the idea.

Instead of working on all 20 commitments simultaneously, States agreed to a two-phase sequence, divided into 2018-2021 and 2021-2025. From the initial list of 50 proposals in 2017, 17 small-scale projects were selected. In 2018, 17 more projects were added to the list and in 2019 another 13. As one of the projects was completed in 2020, the current number amounts to 46 projects. They are grouped under the following headings: training and facilities, land, air, sea, cyber, space and joint enablers. While this thematic classification is useful, it does not distinguish between capabilities and operations sections, nor does it identify high-priority projects that should bring together more participating States. In 2019, the Council itself realized that the number of projects was excessive and decided to postpone the next call until 2021 and from then on to hold it biannually.

The evaluation mechanism is structured on two levels: on the one hand, the national implementation plans reviewed annually by the Secretariat, and, on the other hand, the annual general reviews and the strategic reviews at the end of the two phases. The first evaluation was carried out in May 2019 and the Recommendation 2019/C 166/01 of the Council applauded the increase in defense budgets and the use of community instruments. But at the same time it revealed several shortcomings in implementation: States were encouraged to make significant progress on their commitments, to improve interoperability, to address priorities and difficulties, to provide more information, etc. A year later, in his Recommendation 2020/C 204/01 The Council reached the same conclusion: Progress was modest or limited, and more than two-thirds of projects remained in the ideation phase, making it impossible to complete before the 2025 deadline.. Among the Council's proposals, the following deserve special mention: merge and group existing projects; propose projects with an operational and short-term focus; and expand areas of cooperation to include new challenges such as climate change, AI and hybrid threats.

Regarding the content of the projects, a study carried out in 2019 shows that all 25 priority areas of the Capacity Development Plan are covered by the CEP, but only two projects correspond to the guidelines identified in the Ambition Level. On the other hand, the report highlights that mere activity in one area cannot be equated with a real solution, and there is a lack of clarity about the results. The analyst comes to the conclusion that projects cannot be an end in themselves, but rather should be a means to an end: to build the trust, experience and credibility of the EU as a security provider both within and beyond its borders.

All this suggests that The EPC in its current form lacks focus and ambition, which prevents the achievement of binding obligations established by States themselves. To alleviate these drawbacks, a strategic vision is necessary with emphasis on high-level projects. The potential of the CEP to combine various existing military cooperation programs and achieve true economies of scale is still underexploited. But It is logical to assume that the results of collaborative projects are also shared, whether equipment or soldiers, that is, that they can lay the foundations for an EU armed forces, easily deployable not only in the neighborhood but also around the world. To this end, it is essential to forge a culture of cooperation by overcoming the “NATO reflex” at the military level, and at the diplomatic level through peer pressure and leadership.

The CEP and NATO

The CEP is based on the idea that enhanced capabilities also benefit NATO and respond to the demand for burden sharing (in reference to the 2% spending threshold, although not explicitly stipulated). It is clear that the Member States see the CEP as a complement to NATO rather than a replacement or competitor, having been the EU-NATO general cooperation framework established at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. This complementarity is explained by the fact that almost all EPC members also belong to NATO and this remains the guarantor of European security, while the CSDP focuses on management of crisis. Since States only have a single set of forces, these can be deployed in different frameworks, not limited to the EU, but also under the UN and NATO. In this sense, the Military Mobility project has become the star of the CEP precisely because it benefits both organizations.

However, The United States was quick to express concern about the CEP. This surprising opposition is due to US commercial interests, as the fear of “Fortress Europe” threatens its defense exports to the EU. After two years of stagnation and lobbying in favor of defense companies, in November 2020 the Council through the decision 15529/18 approved the conditions that third countries must meet to participate in EPC projects. The document establishes political conditions (sharing the values ​​and interests of the EU), substantive conditions (providing added value to the project without generating dependency) and legal conditions (signing an international agreement); and requires unanimous approval. Political standards make the exclusion of Türkiye and China very likely. Hence, the potential partners are the United Kingdom, Norway, the United States and Canada. Additional conditions and procedures are specified for non-EU companies.

There has been speculation about a possible NATO observer status in the CEP and vice versa. Although this idea will surely meet with many objections, the independent experts They are in favor of maximizing performance and transparency. Others point out the need for whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches to guarantee the acceptance of all actors, including the Ministries of Infrastructure, Economy or Transport, military personnel and attachés in embassies, as well as private companies. This is crucial for the long-term sustainability of the CEP since many defense initiatives have had short life cycles due to its political nature and the absence of support from the military. The genuine willingness to cooperate is also the key to linking the CEP to other NATO formations, such as the German FNC and EI2french launched in 2013 and 2018 respectively.

Joe Biden's victory in the US elections offers an optimistic outlook, as it promises to strengthen international alliances. Although many see this as a opportunity for US return and European withdrawal from the security scene, it is rather an opportunity for greater EU integration. Macron has been the main proponent of the EU's strategic autonomy, maintaining that “the United States will only respect us as allies if we are serious about our own position, and if we have our own sovereignty with respect to our defense.” “America is Back” and the “Geopolitical Commission” are perfectly positioned to establish effective diplomatic cooperation to address global challenges, from Russia and China, to authoritarianism, the health crisis and climate change.

Conclusion

In the words of Federica Mogherini, then High Representative of the EU, the CEP is a mechanism that seeks not only to increase investment, but also to promote defense cooperation. The CEP is undoubtedly an important step in EU integration, as it goes beyond diplomatic rhetoric and into the world of operational capabilities, combining the resources of almost all EU Member States. 

Permanent Structured Cooperation provides the perfect framework to achieve strategic autonomy thanks to its long-term orientation (it is permanent as its name suggests) and binding nature. And, although in principle, the CEP does not cover a force stand-by, its success could build the necessary trust and political will for the future creation of a common EU army.

However, so far the EPC projects have not gained ground, largely remaining in the ideation phase and barely covering the Union's strategic security deficiencies. What is required now is to go beyond voluntariness, establish specific execution deadlines and evaluation mechanisms, and internalize cooperation.